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ECONOMIC PARAMETERS OF END-OF-LIFE
CARE: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN
AN ERA OF HEALTH CARE REFORM
MICHAEL ASH*

&

STEPHEN ARONS**

Decisions about patient care at the end of life are perhaps the
most complex, emotionally wrenching, and difficult-yet among the
least avoidable-of all of life's decisions. Although the dilemmas
of end-of-life care decision-making have many common threads,
each situation is inherently unique to the patient and his family.
These decisions reflect health care resources; personal, cultural, and
religious values; family relationships and life experience; and a be
wildering variety of understandings of the meaning of life and
death. The choice between palliative care and the continuation of
curative effort-or treatment-is among the most difficult of these
end-of-life decisions.
Factors external to the relationships among patient, family, and
physician sometimes influence the choice between treatment and
palliative care. Cultural, religious, and political pressures, as well as
media attention and legal complications may arise that can trans
form the intimate uniqueness of an end-of-life decision into a state,
national, or even international cause celebre. 1 Less familiar per
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1. The tragic case of Terri Schiavo received an embarrassing level of national and
international attention as the United States Congress and President George W. Bush
sought to intervene and manipulate the decisions of the Florida state courts. A
thoughtful and useful discussion of the lessons to be learned from this legal and policy
debacle can be found in a special issue of Palliative and Supportive Care: The Lessons of
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haps, are the economic and policy parameters of end-of-life care
decisions, and the impact that economic incentives or disincentives
may have on the availability and quality of end-of-life care. Some
people find it unpleasant, even morally offensive, to contemplate
how the economics of health care policy might affect end-of-life
care, holding that money should not matter when life and death are
on the line and that any form of health care "rationing" may convey
a disrespect for human life. Others may propose changes in end-of
life care as a way to reduce low-productivity, "futile" or "wasteful"
health care spending, or to transfer scarce health care dollars to
preventive medicine or to younger patients with longer life expec
tancies. 2 Outside of the conflicts sometimes generated between
these two competing agendas,3 the majority of citizens are probably
unaware of the existence and effect of economic incentives built
into such things as the Medicare hospice benefit or the provision of
palliative care in hospitals or nursing homes.
In this Article, we introduce and briefly explore some of what
is known, as well as what is not known, about the economics of end
of-life care and its policy implications. We attempt to stay largely in
the realm of positive analysis, describing the policy parameters and
what is known about behavioral responses to those parameters. We
attempt to identify areas in which further economic research might
be important, and we suggest that the health care reform that
Americans are demanding and that politicians have been promising
the Terri Schiavo Case. See 4 PALLIATIVE & SUPPORTIVE CARE 111 (2006). This vol
ume was guest edited by Lewis Cohen, MD. The earlier case of Nancy Cruzan was no
less painful for the family involved, and it received national media attention for years;
however, its handling by the courts was not the subject of such overt political and ideo
logical warfare. For the best source of the personal, medical, and legal facts of that
case, see WILLIAM COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002).
For a discussion of the culture wars as they are affecting end-of-life care issues more
generally, see Stephen Arons; Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: Constitu
tional Right or Criminal Act, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 309,338-55 (2007) [hereinafter
Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S.].
2. For a discussion on "medical futility," a term that may be more conclusive than
descriptive, see Zita Lazzarini, Stephen Arons & Alice Wisniewski, Legal and Policy
Lessons from the Schiavo Case: Is Our Right to Choose the Medical Care We Want Seri
ously at Risk?, 4 PALLIATIVE AND SUPPORTIVE CARE 145 (2006).
3. Some health care personnel regard the economics of end-of-life care as a virtu
ally radioactive topic. This is apparently because of the fear that any suggestion that
palliative care might be less expensive than the full pursuit of medical treatment-no
matter how much that may extend the suffering of a dying person-amounts to an in
centive to disregard the value of human life. The issue has obvious religious and ideo
logical overtones. One intention of this Article is to provide some facts and suggestions
for further research in the hope that palliative care can be considered on its medical
rather than ideological merits in individual cases and in policymaking.
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should include changes in the economics of end-of-life care de
signed to make palliative care more readily and equally available to
all. We set our exploration in the context of a particular legal and
policy issue-whether the availability of quality palliative care at
the end of life is unduly and unfairly restricted by individual or ag
gregate economic policies of government at the state or federal
levels. To put the matter bluntly, we ask whether some Americans
die in unnecessary pain and suffering, robbed of dignity and sepa
rated from the comfort of their families, because of economic in
centives and disincentives built into particular government
regulations of end-of-life care. We ask these questions at a time
when national attention and increasing resources are being trained
on health care reform. In general, we address ourselves to two
broad sets of questions.
The first set of questions includes: What are the costs and ben
efits associated with the choice between palliative care to increase
the quality of remaining life and curative treatment designed to in
crease time spent living? How are the costs and benefits distributed
institutionally; for example, how do they accrue to hospitals, hos
pices, other health care providers, public and private insurers, and
patients? How are costs and benefits distributed socially? How are
they distributed across age groups, social classes, and ethnic and
racial groups?
These are followed by the next set of. questions: How would
alternative policies affect the choices made by consumers and sup
pliers of different forms of end-of-life care? Would the gross costs
and benefits of health care change with alternative policies, and
how will the distribution of those costs and benefits change?
After an initial statement about the legal and policy context of
our questions, we have organized these general areas of inquiry into
four parts. In each of those four parts we combine some descrip
tion of how Medicare or other rules operate with discussion of the
existing evidence on the effects or implications of those rules and
incentives.
Part I provides a brief discussion of the legal and policy issues
surrounding end-of-life care in the United States. In Part II, we
describe briefly some of the major institutions and structures for
delivery of end-of-life care. In Part III, we discuss whether the utili
zation of palliative care at the end of life produces significant cost
savings over advanced medical treatment, potentially distorting the
judgment of doctors or other health care providers or making it
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more difficult for terminal patients and their families to make in
formed choices about care. In Part IV, we examine policies that
segregate end-of-life care from the other parts of the health care
system, exploring the discontinuities between aggressive treatment
in a hospital and palliative care in a hospice setting. We focus on
the all-or-nothing nature of the choices that patients or their doc
tors may have to make because of reimbursement regulations af
fecting health care institutions. Finally, in Part V, we examine some
of the consequences of the underdeveloped and understructured
end-of-life care system, suggesting demographic distortions in the
availability and quality of palliative care based on race and poverty
as possible results of the economics of end-of-life care.
I.

THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXTS OF PALLIATIVE CARE

Before examining the economies of end-of-life care, it is useful
to understand the legal and policy issues surrounding the end-of-life
debate. The question whether any government can constitutionally
deny a patient access to palliative care received national attention
in the Supreme Court's 1997 decisions in Washington v. Glucks
berg4 and Vacca v. Quill. s The central question in these joined
cases concerned whether there was any constitutional impedi
ment-in either the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment6-to Washington or New York's crirninal
ization of what was then referred to as "physician-assisted suicide."7
A unanimous Court decided that there were no such impediments,
that there is no fundamental right for a terminally ill person in in
tractable pain to hasten her own death with the aid of a physician.
But in five of the six opinions written in support of that decision,
there was ample reasoning to suggest, as Justice Breyer did, that
the laws of New York and of Washington do not prohibit doctors
from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain de
spite the risk that those drugs themselves will kill. ...
Were the legal circumstances different-for example, were
state law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the
4. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
5. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. A more accurate and neutral term, and the one used in this Article, is "physi
cian-aided dying." See KATHRYN L. TUCKER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'y FOR LAW &
POLICY, CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE: LESSONS FROM OREGON 2 (2008), http://www.
acslaw.orglfileslKathryn % 20L. %20Tucker%20Issue %20Brief. pdf.
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administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of
life-then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise unavoid
able physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly
at issue. And as Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might
have to revisit its conclusions in these cases. s

A number of commentators have observed that although the
Glucksberg court found no constitutional right to physician-aided
dying, it did suggest that a right to palliative care might be discov
ered in the Fourteenth Amendment if the facts in a future case
demonstrated that any state's laws "obstruct the provision of ade
quate palliative care, especially for the alleviation of pain and other
physical symptoms of people facing death."9 The question then be
comes, "what kind of state laws or state action should be surveyed
to find out whether a government has placed an undue burden
upon the provision or receipt of adequate palliative care?"
There are many overt ways that a state or the federal govern
ment might create burdens on palliative care that could be found to
be constitutionally unacceptable. A number of these were dis
cussed in a previous Western New England Law Review article on
the politics of health law.l° For example, the National Right to Life
Committee has produced a model act for state legislatures aimed at
restricting the right to refuse certain medical treatments when that

8. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791-92. There is great irony-no doubt satisfying to
the plaintiffs in Glucksberg-that in November of 2008 the voters of Washington State
approved a physician-aided dying law nearly identical to Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act by a fifty-nine to forty-one percent vote. See Washington Death with Dignity Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.020 (West 2009); John Iwasaki, State Second in Nation
to Allow Lethal Prescriptions, SEATILE PosT-INTELLlGENCER, Nov. 5, 2008, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.comllocaIl386450_initiatives05.html; see also Initiative Mea
sure No. 1000: The Washington Death with Dignity Act (Jan. 24, 2008), http://
www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/ilOOO.pdf. The State of Montana has also
moved towards creating a right to physician aid in dying. See Kathryn L. Tucker, Pri
vacy and Dignity at the End of Life: Protecting the Right of Montanans to Choose Aid in
Dying, 68 MONTANA L. REV. 317 (2007); see also Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787,
2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) (finding this right in the
state constitution).
9. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Consti
tutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997); see also TUCKER,
supra note 7, at 3-4 & n.18. It is worth noting that although palliative care and physi
cian-aided dying are often portrayed as alternative, competing end-of-life policies, the
nine-year experience of Oregon has been that the legalization and regulation of physi
cian-aided dying has brought with it a substantial increase in the availability and quality
of palliative care in Oregon. TUCKER, supra note 7, at 9.
10. See Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S., supra note 1, at 338-55.
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refusal might hasten a patient's death. l l On the federal level, for
mer Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to cripple Ore
gon's Death with Dignity Act by issuing an order that would have
cast a chill over every palliative care physician in the nation by
threatening to revoke any doctor's license to prescribe drugs listed
in the Controlled Substances Act, Schedule II if such opiates were
prescribed with the intent to hasten the death of a terminally ill
patient. 12 That order was found by the Supreme Court to have ex
ceeded the authority given the attorney general under the Con
trolled Substances Act. 13 As is appropriate, the Court in Gonzales
v. Oregon interpreted the reach of the statute, rather than the con
stitutional issue suggested by the five Justices in Glucksberg. But
the facts nevertheless could have supported a constitutional ruling
on a putative right to palliative care as Justices Breyer and
O'Connor had suggested might be found. 14 Other examples of
overt placement of government obstacles to palliative care include
the conduct of the War on Drugs at the federal level, the regulation
of medical practice at the state level,15 and criminal prosecutions of
physicians and nurses for practicing palliative care in line with ac
cepted medical standards. 16
It is possible that any of these examples of overt state action
directed against the provision of palliative care might constitute
part of a fact pattern capable of sustaining a claim for a constitu
tional right to palliative care. But it is also possible, and more im
portant, that an aggregate of many smaller state actions-especially
the reimbursement regulations and economic structuring of Medi
care or Medicaid end-of-life care benefits, or the regulation of pri
vate health insurers and the reimbursement of private nursing
homes-could contribute to an overall systemic burdening of pallia
11. MODEL STARVATION & DEHYDRATION OF PERS. WITH DISABILITIES PREVEN
TION Acr (2006), available at http://www.nrlc.org!euthanasiaIMODELN&HStateLaw_
pdf.
12. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-971 (2000).
13. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006).
14. Id. at 249; see supra text accompanying note 8.
15. See, e.g., Charles Wilson, Establishing a Right to Palliative Care at the End of
Life, 2 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 15 (1999), available at http://www.umass.eduflegaIlArons/
Spring2007/397N/397N-bazelon-pall-care.pdf.
16. See Lewis Cohen et aI., Accusations of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life
Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096, 1096-104 (2005). The study referred to in the article
is still in progress. See Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S., supra note 1, at 346-50; Ben A.
Rich, Overcoming Legal Barriers to Competent and Compassionate Pain Relief for the
Dying Patient, AM. PAIN SOC'Y BULL., Winter 2005, available at http://www.ampainsoc.
org!pu blbulletin/win05/la wl.htm.
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tive care by state action. That would open a more subtle but signifi
cant analysis of how states might, whether wittingly or not, be
discouraging or obstructing the provision of quality palliative care
to the terminally ill.
Finally, and most important for purposes of this Article, it is
possible that this same aggregate of economic regulations, reim
bursement practices, and palliative care policies-if discovered to
discourage the provision of palliative care-might constitute the ba
sis for designing and demanding legislative reform of certain as
pects of the health care system. Since the nation is in the midst of
once again launching an attempt at health care reform, knowledge
of and expanded research into the economic parameters of pallia
tive care for end-of-life patients could be extremely important. It is
this inquiry about the economics of palliative care that we hope to
help stimulate with this Article.
II.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF END-OF-LIFE CARE

The main manifest functions of end-of-life care are to respect
patient and family preferences regarding the end of life and to pro
vide the highest possible quality of life to people with conditions
that make death imminent. A recent consideration in end-of-life
care is on the election of palliative care and the foregoing of efforts
at curative treatment. Two key structures of end-of-life care in the
United States are hospice, which embodies the election for pallia
tive care, and advance directives, which govern the expression of
intent regarding choice among treatments, or choice between treat
ment and palliation, in light of the possibility that the individual
may later lose the capacity for either expression or intent.
Hospice refers to a care process whose aim is to provide com
fort and cogency during the process of dying for the dying person
and her family. Hospice does not have a specified location; hospice
can be provided in dedicated hospice facilities, nursing homes, hos
pitals, and in homes. In hospice, the dying person is provided with
access to symptom relief and pain management, counseling, and
emotional and material support, such as housekeepingP
17. COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INST. OF MED., ApPROACHING
DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 30-32 (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K.
Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter ApPROACHING DEATH]; see also NAT'L CONSENSUS PRO·
JECT, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY PALLIATIVE CARE 57-61 (2004),
http://www.nationalconsensusproject.orglGuideline.pdf.
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Medicare Part A, which provides hospital insurance to almost
everyone age sixty-five and over, as well as to some categories of
disabled nonelderly, includes a hospice benefit.ls The benefit re
quires a physician's diagnosis that the patient has less than six
months to live, and the discontinuation of curative treatment for
the terminal illness. All other appropriate medical care provided
under Medicare Part A (and Part B if the patient is covered) con
tinues for treatment of health problems unrelated to the terminal
illness. The hospice benefit includes physician and nursing care for
the relief of symptoms and for pain management; medical appli
ances, equipment, and supplies; outpatient drugs for symptom man
agement; and pain relief. Access to prescription drugs for pain
relief, including opiates and palliative chemotherapy agents, is sub
stantially expanded and cheaper for patients using the hospice ben
efit than for those in the standard Medicare program. The benefit
includes significantly more availability of home care than is offered
under the standard Medicare benefit, including the services of a
home health aide and homemaker services. In fact, provision of
home heath aides is highly constrained under Medicare, and home
maker services are entirely unavailable. 19
The patient may use the benefit essentially indefinitely, even if
she lives beyond the initial six-month diagnosis, as long as a physi
cian will recertify the diagnosis of less than six months to live.
Medicare sometimes investigates providers whose patients have
substantial incidence of survival in hospice beyond six months. The
patient retains the right to discontinue hospice care and return to
standard Medicare coverage and may also reenter hospice with
recertification of terminal illness.
Although almost one-quarter of Medicare beneficiaries are
now enrolled in private managed care organizations under the
Medicare Part C (Advantage) program, the hospice benefit is ad
ministered and funded through traditional Medicare. Patients re
vert to traditional Medicare when they enter Medicare-funded
hospice. Medicare covered 78.6% of hospice discharges in 2000,

18. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
NEW ApPROACHES IN MEDICARE 140-41 (2004), available at http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/June04_Entire_Report.pdf [hereinafter NEW ApPROACHES IN MEDICARE].
19. MARILYN MOON & CRISTINA BOCCUTl, THE URBAN INST., MEDICARE AND
END-OF-LIFE CARE (2002), available at http://www.urban.org!UploadedPDF/1000442_
Medicare.pdf; see also Carol Raphael, Joann Ahrens & Nicole Fowler, Financing End
of-Life Care in the USA, 94 J. ROYAL SOC'y MED. 458 (2001).
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with the remaining fifth covered largely by private insurers or by
the Medicaid hospice benefit.20
Medicaid, a shared state and federal health insurance program,
provides health care to elderly and nonelderly persons who meet
income and family-structure eligibility criteria. As Medicaid is sub
ject to both federal and state regulation and funding, there is varia
tion across states in the range and generosity of the benefits, with
the federal government requiring states to offer some mandatory
benefits. Hospice care is not among the mandated Medicaid bene
fits. However, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia cur
rently include a hospice benefit in Medicaid. 21 Among people
jointly covered by Medicare and Medicaid, Medicare reimburses
hospice providers more generously than does Medicaid. Medicaid
covered only 5.1 % of hospice discharges in 2000. 22
Private insurance is the primary source of health care coverage
for the non-elderly, and employment-based health insurance is the
most common form of insurance in this category. Private insurance
covered thirteen percent of hospice discharges in 2000.23 The cen
tral role of Medicare in hospice is not surprising because the elderly
constitute a high share of all deaths as well as deaths in hospice.
Medicare, furthermore, plays an important institutional role in
the structure of hospice care both because hospices, like hospitals,
require certification by the Medicare system to be eligible for funds
and because other insurance systems piggyback on the Medicare
hospice system. Medicare licensing is required for participation in
Medicaid and most private hospice programs.24 As an example of
employment-based health insurance reliance on the Medicare-cre
ated structure of the hospice system, the Massachusetts state em
ployees' health insurance plan covers hospice care with much the
same restrictions and benefits as Medicare in any Medicare-licensed
20. Barbara J. Haupt, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHARACfERIS
TICS OF HOSPICE CARE DISCHARGES AND THEIR LENGTH OF SERVICE: UNITED STATES,
2000, at 10 tbl.1 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/sr13_154.pdf [herein
after CHARACfERISTICS OF HOSPICE CARE DISCHARGES]' Almost all hospice dis
charges are associated with the death of the patient. A small fraction may represent a
return to conventional care. Id. at 4.
21. Lainie Rutkow, Optional or Optimal?: The Medicaid Hospice Benefit at
Twenty, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 107, 123-24, n.102 (2005) (listing the rules
and regulations of participating states, as well as noting that Connecticut, New Hamp
shire, and Oklahoma do not provide Medicaid hospice benefit rules).
22. CHARACTERISTICS OF HOSPICE CARE DISCHARGES, supra note 20, at 10 tbl.1.
23. [d.
24. Chester A. Robinson, Thomas Hoyer & Carol Blackford, The Continuing
Evolution of Medicare Hospice Policy, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Jan.-Feb 2007, at 127, 128.
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hospice program. 25 Some private insurers have experimented with
more flexible access to the hospice benefit, in particular with the
rule regarding the six-month limitation. 26
Advance directives are an important part of the end-of-life de
cision-making process for the approximately twenty percent of
Americans who have them. 27 Advance directives may be living
wills, designation of health care proxies, do-not-resuscitate (DNR)
orders, or other forms authorized by state law. They express the
treatment intentions of the patient-made while competent-in the
event that he loses the capacity to continue to participate in treat
ment decisions. 28 Although the reach and limitations of advance
directives vary from state to state, they all express the principle of
patient autonomy and the right of incompetent as well as compe
tent patients to refuse unwanted medical treatment or have it with
drawn. 29 Federal law requires that federally aided health care
institutions in each state inform patients of state policies regarding
advance directives. 3D Advance directives do not solve all problems
that might arise concerning the choice between treatment and
palliative care, but they do create parameters within which eco
nomic and other incentives apply.31
25. See, e.g., UNICARE, UNICARE STATE INDEMNITY PLAN BASIC: MEMBER
HANDBOOK FOR AcnVE EMPLOYEES AND NON-MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREES 30, 42
(2008), http://www.unicare-cip.com!PDF/serieslhndbk0608.pdf.
26. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
27. The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Prefer
ences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); see
also LAST ACTS, MEANS TO A BETTER END: A REPORT ON DYING IN AMERICA (2002),
http://www.rwjf.orgifiles/publications/other/meansbetterend.pdf.
28. The decision-making process for treatment of legally incompetent patients
without advance directives is regulated by state law, but that law may be constrained by
constitutional rights of privacy or substantive due process liberty. See Stephen Arons,
Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care, in LIVING WITH DYING: A HANDBOOK FOR
END-OF-LIFE HEALTHCARE PRACTITIONERS 730, 732-42 (Joan Berzoff & Phyllis R.
Silverman eds., 2004) [hereinafter Arons, Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care].
29. The right to refuse medical treatment, or to have it withdrawn, has both com
mon law and constitutional dimensions, and, therefore, its regulation by state law has
some limitations. ld. at 738-42.
30. Patient Self Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.c. § 1395 (2000).
3l. See Arons, Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care, supra note 28, at 734-38;
see also Ben A. Rich, Advance Directives: The Next Generation, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1
(1998); Rich, supra note 16. The utility and appropriateness of advance directives, es
pecially living wills, have been contested by some conservatives who contend that an
aging and dying patient has lost much of the autonomy that justifies the making of
living wills in the first place. This view was expressed by the President's Council on
Bioethics during the administration of George W. Bush. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 53-91
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We examine several aspects of advance directives, including
their adoption before or at the onset of illness as well as their appli
cation in the event of loss of decision-making capacity. There is
variation across states in the regulation of advance directives and
other decision making about end-of-life care. Two important policy
dimensions are the incentives for provider compliance with advance
directives and alternative appointment of a proxy or surrogate deci
sion maker in the absence of an advance directive. 32 Some incen
tives for compliance are as mild as the legislative requirement that
properly executed advance treatment directives are legally binding.
More specific incentives include the specification of civil or criminal
penalties for physicians who disregard advance directives. Some
regulations include the specification of conditions under which a
physician can refuse to comply with an advance directive, which
could either reduce or increase the incentive for providers to com
ply.33 Still other regulations provide a liability waiver for actions
arising out of good-faith compliance with an advance directive.
III.

CAN PALLIATIVE CARE REDUCE THE COST
OF

U.S.

HEALTH CARE?

There is substantial debate in the policy literature on the possi
bility of controlling the economic costs of end-of-life care. The
hope for cost savings in changing patterns of end-of-life care from
life extension to palliative care emerges from the observation that
end-of-life Medicare spending, defined as Medicare spending in the
365 days preceding death, constitutes about one-quarter of all
Medicare spending. In 1988, Medicare spent $13,316 per elderly
decedent in the last year of life, and total health care costs per dece
dent ran approximately $29,300. Spending on an average Medicare
beneficiary was slightly more than $1900. Although all amounts
have increased, the share spent on decedents has remained stable. 34
The underlying facts concern the large share (and level) of Medi
care expenditure on patients in their last year of life. The widely
(2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/taking...care/taking...care.pdf. But
the anti-autonomy view has long been contested by leading bioethics experts such as
George Annas. See, e.g., George Annas, Book Review, The Practice of Autonomy:
Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions, 283 JAMA 930 (2000).
32. See generally Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Advance Directives and
Medical Treatment at the End of Life, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 111 (2004).
33. Id. at 113. It is not specified if such provisions are modeled as increasing or
decreasing incentives for compliance. See id.
34. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, The Economics of Dying-The Illu
sion of Cost Savings at the End of Life, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 540 (1994).
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quoted, stylized fact is that twenty-seven percent of Medicare ex
penditure pays for care for the five percent of recipients who die
during the year. 35 Extrapolations to the general population and the
social construction of much of this care as "futile care" suggests that
large cost savings are possible by containing expenditure on end-of
life care.
The case for cost savings in end-of-life care that focused on
palliative rather than curative intervention may have been adopted
strategically by early advocates of the adoption of hospice policy.36
Hospice, which advocates saw as a substantial improvement on the
medicalized and-in their estimation-degrading way of death,
could be pitched more broadly as a cost-effective health care solu
tion. There may be an important analogy here. 37 While the appeal
to efficiency may have attracted some cost-cutters to the hospice
movement, the same appeal may have also cost support among
those repelled by the prospect of reducing medical effort for dying
people based on economic reasons.
Regardless of the moral dilemmas posed by introducing cost
considerations in the allocation of care, a central positive considera
tion is whether there are substantial cost savings in reallocating the
care effort. Emanuel and Emanuel offer five criticisms of optimis
tic cost-containment scenarios: (1) the straightforward error of ex
trapolating the twenty-seven to thirty percent of Medicare to a
similar share of all medical expenditure; (2) selection bias in obser
vational demonstrations of the low cost of alternative end-of-life
care; (3) the high cost of high-quality alternatives (e.g., hospice
based end-of-life care); (4) the unpredictability of death and the
difficulty in advance identification of "futile" care-in particular us
ing retrospective data; and (5) the widespread adoption of DNR
orders, which limit the application of futile but highly expensive
services at the very end of life, may mean that the low-hanging fruit
of end-of-life cost savings has already been picked and marginal
35. This stylized fact is reviewed at many places in the literature, both in studies
that see opportunities for cost reduction and in second-generation literature critiquing
the earlier studies. For examples of second-generation literature, see Ezekiel J. Eman
uel, Cost Savings at the End of Life: What Do the Data Show?, 275 JAMA 1908 (1996);
Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 34, at 540; Anna A. Scitovsky, "The High Cost of
Dying" Revisited, 72 MILBANK Q. 561 (1994).
36. Robinson, Hoyer & Blackford, supra note 24, at 128.
37. In the 1960s and 1970s, the social movement on behalf of the mentally ill
favored deinstitutionalization to combat medicalization and to empower sufferers from
mental illness. In some cases, this movement joined forces with cost cutters who saw
deinstitutionalization as a way to relieve strained public sector budgets.
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switching from aggressive to palliative care will yield smaller
savings. 38
The potential cost savings aside, the actual cost savings of re
placing aggressive curative treatment until death with a palliative
model appear to be small relative to national health care expendi
ture. A reasonable estimate is that 3.3% of total national health
care expenditure might be saved by a conversion away from aggres
sive curative treatment, and more importantly, that the growth rate
of health care expenditure would be unaffected. 39 Furthermore,
end-of-life care has not been a site of disproportionate growth of
health care expenditure, so changes only to this component of
health care cannot reduce the rapid growth that has been the focus
of cost-control efforts. It is possible that improving the manage
ment of end-of-life care could significantly reduce end-of-life care
costs, even if it is not a feasible approach to reducing the growth in
national expenditure on health care. There is some variation across
studies in the extent of cost reduction possible through alternative
management of end-of-life care.
Despite the common sense of the assumption that replacing fu
tile, high-intensity curative care for dying patients with palliative
care would reduce health care costs, a consensus has developed that
such cost reductions are illusory. There are two critical points in
this somewhat unexpected finding: first, high quality hospice care is
itself expensive; and second, identification of dying patients, for
whom additional curative efforts would be futile, is not easily done
in advance.
Emanuel and Emanuel observe that the after-the-fact defini
tion of end-of-life spending creates the illusion of high end-of-life
expenditure. People in the last year of life have high medical costs
because they have faced grave health crises to which life-saving care
attempts were applied. Well-matched survivors would be people
who faced similarly grave health crises but for whom life-saving
care was successful. A comparison of decedents to all survivors,
rather than to well-matched survivors, overstates the expenditure
on decedents.4o Since survival or death is not foreseeable in ad
38. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 34, at 542.
39. Id. at 544.
40. Christopher Hogan et aI., Medicare Beneficiaries' Costs of Care in the Last
Year of Life, 20 HEALTH AFF. 188, 193-94 (2001). The actual subtitle of the article is
"End-of-life costs are only slightly higher for persons who died than for survivors with
similar characteristics." Id. While this analysis does not in fact appear in the article, it
does appear in a final report to Medpac by the same authors. See C. Hogan et aI.,
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vance in many cases, the potential cost savings are significantly
overstated. There is little reason to believe that health care provid
ers can effectively distinguish future decedents from survivors in
time to make decisions about reducing the cost of care.
Although end-of-life care represents approximately a quarter
of Medicare spending and overall Medicare spending has grown
sharply over time, the end-of-life share of Medicare spending has
been remarkably stable. 41 New developments or applications of ex
pensive interventions have not been disproportionately focused on
end-of-life care.
Emanuel and Emanuel also note that the figure has been in
flated by the casual and inaccurate extension of the end-of-life
twenty-seven percent share of Medicare spending to the share of
end-of-life spending in all health expenditure. 42 Medicare enrollees
die at much higher rates than do the general population, and the
overall share of end-of-life expenditure in the national health care
bill is substantially below twenty-seven percent.
Micro studies of changing the organization of end-of-life care
have yielded mixed results with respect to cost savings. Some stud
ies have even shown higher Medicare cost for hospice users than for
nonusers. 43 Medicare does not pay for long-term nursing home
care, which composes a significant portion of end-of-life care for
elderly patients. Thus, for the most elderly decedents, Medicare
costs are somewhat lower relative to younger decedents even if
overall health care costs increase.
Other studies have shown decreased costs associated with hos
pice use. A case-control study found that hospital-based hospice
services substantially reduced end-of-life costs, with savings of al
most $5000 among decedents who died in the hospital. The savings
were largely determined by lower intensive care unit (lCU) costs
for the hospice participants, although reduced pharmacy and lab
costs were substantial as well. Savings were smaller for participants
who were discharged alive from the hospital, largely based on the
reduced use of ICU for both hospice users and nonusers.44
Medicare Beneficiaries' Costs and Use of Care in the Last Year of Life, Contractor
Research Series Report No. 00-1 (Washington: Medicare Payment Advisory Commis
sion, May 2000).
41. Raphael, Ahrens & Fowler, supra note 19, at 458.
42. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 34, at 542-43.
43. Raphael, Ahrens & Fowler, supra note 19, at 459.
44. R. Sean Morrison et aI., Cost Savings Associated with US Hospital Palliative
Care Consultation Programs, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1783 (2002).

2009]

ECONOMIC PARAMETERS OF END-OF-UFE CARE

319

Emanuel and Emanuel are critical of nonexperimental studies
for two reasons. First, hospice participants are self selected and
may likely have used fewer resources in the conventional care set
ting had they not opted for hospice. 45 This selection bias leads to
overestimates of the savings from hospice care. Second, entrance
into hospice may be associated with the realization that further cur
ative efforts are futile, while the hospice nonusers had the potential
for realizing gains from continuing curative effort.46
There have been only limited experimental evaluations of hos
pice as a cost-saving institution, and these have suffered from signif
icant design flaws. 47 High quality end-of-life care is quite intensive
in labor costs as well as in costs for pharmaceuticals. 48 Far from
constituting a cheap way out, as the withdrawal of high-cost cura
tive methods would imply, hospice requires time from physicians
and nurses as well as aides and social workers. Furthermore, the
pain-relief medications and other symptom-alleviating interven
tions can be high tech and expensive, e.g., chemotherapy or radia
tion therapy to limit or reverse functional impairment from tumors.
In a simple tabulation subject to all of the caveats described above,
hospice-using and non-using decedents had similar Medicare spend
ing ($17,790 for nonusers, $19,950 for users) and total health care
spending ($26,047 for nonusers and $27,202 for users).49 Hospice
care alone cost $4186 per hospice user, which was offset by mod
estly lower hospital inpatient and other care for users.50
For these fundamental reasons, changing end-of-life care prac
tice is unlikely to have a significant effect on the global cost of
health care. However, while the macro picture may suggest that
changing end-of-life care policy is not the panacea for high health
care costs, there are likely micro policy changes that can signifi
cantly increase the quality of care at small or even negative cost.
The micro policy changes concern the environment in which physi
cians make decisions regarding the application of palliative care,
the reimbursement of different health care providers at different
phases of the end-of-life process, and the potential for unfair or
45. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 34, at 541.
46. Id. at 541-42.
47. Id. (assessing multiple studies in a review table).
48. See generally Vincent Mor & David Kidder, Cost Savings in Hospice: Final
Results of the National Hospice Study, 20 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 407 (1985).
49. MOON & BOCCUTI, supra note 19, at 17.
50. Id. at 17 tbl.4.
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inefficient cost shifting among paid providers, informal caregivers,
and patients.
Although gross costs may not be easily addressed by end-of
life policy, it is clear that policy exerts significant control over the
distribution of the costs of end-of-life care. Policies should be ex
amined for their impact on current and potential cost shifting
among providers, caregivers, patients, and the public sector. Some
of the cost shifting is explicit in the regulation of the hospice sys
tem. As noted above, Medicare Advantage (Medicare HMO) pa
tients revert to the traditional Medicare system for the funding of
hospice care. There is anecdotal evidence that skilled nursing facili
ties and nursing homes sometimes discharge dying patients to hos
pitals to avoid the cost of care for the dying. 51 Hospitals can also
operate hospices and change the mix of Medicare-reimbursable and
nonreimbursable care. 52
IV.

PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND PATIENTS: THE DISTRIBUTION
OF COSTS OF END-OF-LIFE CARE

In the absence of net systemic savings, there may still be im
portant cost savings to some parties. However, without net sav
ings-the finding that broadly characterizes the review of the
literature in Part III-cost savings to one party imply increased
costs to other parties. Some changes in who faces the cost of end
of-life care may encourage more careful decision making; other
changes may burden parties who are unable to pay, unable to resist,
or unable to respond in beneficial ways. Particular uses of hospice
may be differentially attractive to providers in the current health
51. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin & Haiden Huskamp, What is Known About the
Economics of End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries?, 42 THE GERONTOLOGIST
(SPECIAL ISSUE III) at 40, 40-43 (2002). The challenging cost of end-of-life care for
nursing homes is discussed at greater length in Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian,
Dying in America-An Examination of Policies that Deter Adequate End-of-Life Care
in Nursing Homes, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 294 (2005).
52. The distribution of the full costs of health care across providers requires sig
nificant new research. Basics of use, such as the rates of use of hospice and other pallia
tive care-within hospitals, in freestanding facilities, or at home-and the
sociodemographic distribution of care, are unknown. Similar questions remain about
rates of creation and application of advance directives. These basics need to be ex
amined before we can move to policy-analytic questions such as the economic factors or
disincentives that account for low rates of utilizing palliative care in these hospice set
tings, or whether changes in the incentive structure (Medicare, private insurers, hospi
tals) would change the use or quality of palliative or hospice care. For an excellent
survey of economic issues in end-of-life care, see ApPROACHING DEATH, supra note 17,
at 155-87.
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care system. Hospitals may, for example, register savings in their
curative activities if terminally ill patients are transferred to exter
nal or hospital-based hospice care. Similarly, nursing homes and
Medicare HMOs see their costs directly affected by the use or non
use of hospice for terminally ill patients. However, changes in tax
payer costs, in financial and time costs for patients and families, and
in resource needs for the hospice system are less well catalogued.
The distribution of the burden needs to be more carefully tracked. 53
On the demand side, a significant barrier to patients' use of
palliative care is the construction of the Medicare hospice benefit.
In this section we examine policies that segregate end-of-life care
from the other parts of the health care system that are most rele
vant to people with grave and possibly terminal illness. We discuss
the functional and dysfunctional components of these segregating
policies.
The required certification of six-month life expectancy for eli
gibility for the hospice benefit is the most explicit segregation of
end-of-life care from other forms of care. The full set of care avail
able under the hospice benefit, including palliative medication,
housekeeping, family support, and counseling are simply unavaila
ble to people who lack the terminal certification. Lack of access to
personal care at home is a significant shortcoming of the Medicare
program. 54 There is insufficient palliative care and pain relief reim
bursement under standard Medicare.
Medicare Part A-hospital insurance-includes coverage for
intravenous opiates but not orally administered opiates, which
greatly facilitate self-regulated, noninvasive pain relief. Orally ad
ministered opiates are now, in principle, covered under Medicare
Part D, but the deductible, copayment, and "doughnut hole"55 sig
nificantly raise the price to patients.
53. Advocates of palliative care have flagged the potential for single-institution
cost saving. See, e.g., Morrison et aI., supra note 44. This is indeed relevant to individ
ual decision makers, for example, hospital administrators. We would encourage more
systemic analysis of the incentives for and costs of providing palliative care.
54. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICARE AND HOME HEALTH CARE (2007), http://www.medicare.gov/
publications/pubs/pdfl10969.pdf. In a section entitled "What isn't covered by the Origi
nal Medicare Plan," the booklet explains that Medicare does not pay for "24-hour-a
day care at home"; delivered meals; "[h]omemaker services like shopping, cleaning, and
laundry when this is the only care ... need[ed], and when these services aren't related
to the plan of care"; or "[p]ersonal care given by home health aides like bathing, dress
ing, and using the bathroom when this is the only care ... need[ed]." Id. at 7.
55. The "doughnut hole" is the range of gross pharmaceutical payments for which
the patient bears full responsibility, from $2250 to $5100 per year. See DEAN BAKER,
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At the same time, patients who are enrolled in Medicare hos
pice face limited access to those high-tech medical resources that
are appropriate for hospice-based end-of-life care. Such interven
tions, while high tech and potentially expensive, are intended to im
prove the quality of life, not necessarily to extend the duration of
life. Per diem reimbursement, which provides incentives for cost
control by transferring the cost to the hospice providers, also pro
vides a disincentive for additional expenditures, even those that
benefit the terminal patient. The per diem reimbursement of hos
pice creates a significant disincentive for hospices to provide poten
tially expensive, high-tech palliative care, such as palliative
chemotherapy or surgery.
The incentive problems with access to high-tech palliative care
in hospice is compounded by widespread confusion among both pa
tients and providers regarding access of hospice patients to curative
care unrelated to the terminal illness. For example, hospice pa
tients are eligible for treatment of infection by antibiotics under the
standard Medicare benefit, but patients and family may incorrectly
worry that enrollment in hospice eliminates access to basic health
care for unrelated or painful conditions.
There are benefits claimed for segregating treatment from hos
pice care. Segregating palliative and curative health care is based on
concern that per diem reimbursement, which provides valuable
flexibility in the types of care provided as well as incentives for cost
control, also creates an incentive to enroll low-maintenance pa
tients for long periods of time. 56 The six-month rule creates an ar
bitrary line between the dying and others, which defines the
availability of the per diem hospice benefit. If the line governing
the availability of the benefit were relaxed with respect to the six
month prognosis, then some other mechanism for allocating hos
pice reimbursement only to terminal patients would have to be
implemented.
The costs of segregating care are significant. Segregation of
care denies important forms of relief both to the dying and to the
not-yet-dying. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the dying
CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, THE ORIGINS OF THE DOUGHNUT HOLE: EXCESS
PROFITS ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (2006), http://www.cepr.net/documents/parcd_
dru&-profits_2006_08.pdf.
56. Interviews with end-of-life care providers have provided a basis for discussing
the costs and benefits of the reimbursement system. See Haiden A. Huskamp et aI.,
Providing Care At the End of Life: Do Medicare Rules Impede Good Care?, 20 HEALTH
AFF. 204 (2001).
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and surviving are not ex ante recognizable, at least not with the
type of predictive precision that the six-month rule would require.
Reducing segregation would create the opportunity to provide
high-quality palliative care both to dying patients for whom cura
tive efforts have been ended and to patients also receiving curative
treatment. 57
The benefit requires a physician's prognosis of life expectancy
less than six months. Uptake of the benefit requires explicit ac
knowledgment that death is near. In fact, Medicare recipients may
exit the hospice program at any time, and the benefit may be indefi
nitely extended in the case of patients who outlive the six-month
prognosis. The six-month rule, then, is effective only insofar as it
discourages uptake by patients who are uncomfortable with explic
itly agreeing to the designation. Several pilot programs have tested
the uptake of the hospice benefit with the relaxation of the six
month prognosis rule, and these programs have demonstrated some
additional uptake, such as the SUPPORT program. 58
Also on the demand side, qualification for the hospice benefit
is a requirement for Medicare-funded access to pain relief medica
tions. There are forms of palliative care that should be available
and funded without initiating the hospice benefit. There is substan
tial evidence that pain is undertreated throughout the U.S. health
care system. 59 Furthermore, qualification for the Medicare hospice
benefit requires the discontinuation of curative treatment for the
disease causing impending death.60 However, the Medicare benefit
57. While six-month prognoses are clinically unreliable, identifying markers of
functional status that could supplant the six-month rule is a significant clinical chal
lenge. See Ellen Fox et al., Evaluation of Prognostic Criteria for Determining Hospice
Eligibility in Patients with Advanced Lung, Heart, or Liver Disease, 282 JAMA 1638
(1999) (demonstrating the extraordinary difficulty in establishing six-month survival
prognoses in noncancer patients in a reanalysis of SUPPORT data); see also supra note
27. The Medicaring project is examining alternative eligibility criteria in multiple
clinical trials. See Palliative Care Policy Center, http://www.medicaring.org/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2009); see also BARBARA GAGE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., IMPORTANT QUESTIONS FOR HOSPICE IN THE NEXT CENTURY (2000), http://
aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/impques.htm (discussing the six-month eligibility rule and
alternati ves).
58. See, e.g., The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supra note 27.
59. See Wilson, supra note 15.
60. Medicare may be revising some of these regulations for illnesses such as can
cer, in which some aspects of traditional treatment may be usefully continued after
admission to hospice because those treatments alleviate suffering even though they may
not extend life. Patients with other illnesses, however, such as end-stage renal failure,
may likewise benefit from treatments such as dialysis but find that these treatments are
not available in hospice even though they reduce suffering.
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is in fact ambiguous about the availability of curative treatment for
other disorders. There is a lack of clarity about coverage for related
disorders, unrelated disorders, and interventions that pertain to the
specific disorder but are intended to relieve symptoms and improve
the quality of life.
The restrictive structure of the hospice benefit likely sup
presses demand for palliative health care. A greater emphasis on
continuity between care at the end of life and care at other stages
would increase demand. The six-month prognosis for hospice-ben
efit eligibility and the unavailability of pain relief to patients outside
the hospice benefit construct a potentially unnecessary division be
tween the dying and the merely ill. The division has the logic of
bureaucratic monitoring behind it; namely, the hospice benefit is
fairly generous for providers, and Medicare fears overuse if compo
nents of the benefit were available without strict rules subject to
monitoring.
Another demand-side barrier is lack of information about end
of-life care opportunities. The evidence on the provision of care
changing the demand for hospice is mixed. There is a new Califor
nia law that provides such information guarantees, and evaluation
of it would be useful for future research. 6l Cost-conscious payers
prefer to focus on measurable processes (e.g., numbers of mam
mograms conducted, chemo doses administered) and outcomes. 62
Medical care providers can increase productivity in the dimensions
of quality (e.g., via better scanning technology) or quantity (e.g., via
electronic medical records) with the application of new technology.
In contrast, it is hard to realize productivity increases in the area of
meaningful communication, which requires scarce face-time be
tween a care provider and the recipients of care. Economists have
observed that areas with low productivity increases are subject to
neglect and disinvestment as they are expensive relative to high
productivity areas. 63
61. Right to Know Act of 2009, H.R. 2747, 2008 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07 -08/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2747 _bill_
20080930_chaptered.pdf.
62. Non-measurable, "soft" activities are often overlooked by highly scrutinized
cost-conscious systems that involve public payment, a concept elaborated on at some
length by Paula England and Nancy Folbre. See Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Con
tracting for Care, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 61 (Mari
anne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 2003).
63. This observation regarding the stresses on sectors with low-productivity
growth, sometimes referred to as the "cost disease of the service sector," is due to New
York University economist William J. Baumol. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S.
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Some analyses focus on the implicit discontinuity of care in
hospice to explain why a relatively generous benefit has rather low
utilization. Hospice enrollment requires a physician's diagnosis
that the patient has less than six months to live. The break from
patient to dying person may discourage enrollment in hospice.
Some experiments with more flexible, continuous transition from
curative to end-of-life palliative care have made palliative care
available immediately following a poor prognosis rather than re
quiring the six-month trigger. 64 As with other dimensions of health
care services, there is evidence that health care providers can in
duce demand for available or profitable services. For example, it is
well established that regions with high densities of hospital beds
have a disproportionate number of in-hospital deaths.65 Demand
for hospice care may lack an advocate among providers in the
health care system.
The core of the Medicare hospice benefit pays providers a per
diem rate, which varies by the intensity of the health care activity:
$110 for routine home care; $644 for continuous home care; $114
for inpatient respite care; and $491 for general inpatient care. 66
Hospice operators report adequate reimbursement except during
initial intake, when extensive counseling and diagnosis is required;
during inpatient crises when the per diem must cover the full cost of
provided care; and in the final stages of death, when highly atten
dant care is required. Because hospice reimbursement is constant,
while costs generally follow a u-shaped trajectory (costs are high at
the beginning and end of hospice use), there is a disincentive for
hospices to accept patients for short stays. Indeed, there is some
evidence that hospices incur financial loss for shorter stays and that
private for-profit hospices are strategic in their enrollment of long
stay patients. There is significant variation among hospices regard
ing financial viability. Nursing homes may face financial barriers to
BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 623 (5th ed. 1991); ENGLAND & FOL·
BRE, supra note 62 (discussing the implications for care services in particular); see also
Nancy Folbre, When a Commodity Is Not Exactly a Commodity, 319 SCIENCE 1769
(2008).
64. LARRY BERESFORD, IRA BYOCK & JEANNE SHEILS, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROMOTING EXCELLENCE IN END-OF-LIFE CARE
19 (2002), available at
http://www.promotingexcellence.orglfiles/public/finance_
monograph.pdf; see also MOON & BoccUTI, supra note 19, at 14 (discussing the Pro
gram of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE».
65. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et aI., Managed Care, Hospice Use, Site of Death, and
Medical Expenditures in the Last Year of Life, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1722,
1727 (2002).
66. MOON & BOCCUTI, supra note 19, at 12 tbL3.
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providing palliative care or hospice care, and these barriers may
reduce the incentives to develop and provide high-quality palliative
care systems, which would in turn attract more dying patients.
The six-month rule provides the Medicare administration with
an opportunity to audit strategic enrollment of long-staying pa
tients.67 A straightforward alternative would be to change the
structure of the hospice benefit by increasing the reimbursement
for enrollment and for the intensive support immediately preceding
death. The Medicare hospice benefit also interacts in a complex
manner with Medicare managed care (Medicare Advantage).
Medicare Advantage enrollees who enter hospice have the hospice
benefit covered by the traditional Medicare program. The hospice
care benefit thus releases the Medicare Advantage program from
the cost of hospice care for patients who enter hospice, the only
Medicare benefit that so reverts from Medicare Advantage to tradi
tional Medicare. Medicare Advantage thus has an outlet to avoid
the high cost of care for dying patients by transferring them to
hospice. 68
The high cost of care for patients who are predicted to have a
high likelihood of death is not fully compensated by the risk-adjust
ment system (DCG-PIP) used to adjust Medicare Advantage pay
ments. Medicare Advantage plans have, in general, avoided
patients likely to die despite the possibility of releasing such pa
tients into the care of hospice under the Medicare hospice benefit.
Because several reconfigurations of care are possible, including
hospice enrollment and Medicare Advantage disenrollment, the im
plications of the program interactions have not been fully explored.
It is clear that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries are more likely to
use hospice (twenty-six percent versus fifteen percent among pa
tients in traditional Medicare), but joint enrollment statuses may
reflect decisions made in the lead-up to death. If there are savings
from hospice care compared to aggressive curative treatment until
death, whose savings are they? The parties that could potentially
benefit include the patient; her family, survivors, or estate; care
providers, with possibly different savings to hospitals and physi
67. See NEW ApPROACHES IN MEDICARE, supra note IS, at 139; see also MEDI
CARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REFORMING THE DE
LIVERY SYSTEM 203 (200S), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/JunOS_EntireReport.
pdf [hereinafter REFORMING THE DELIVERY SYSTEM].
6S. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et aI., The Costs of Decedents in the Medicare Pro
gram: Implications for Payments to the Medicare+Choice Plans, 39 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 111, 114 (2004).
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cians; and insurers, with possibly different implications for private
and public insurers on ultimate savings.
On the supply side, excellent end-of-life care requires provid
ers to communicate with patients and their families. Communica
tion needs to begin early, with the negotiation of desires, needs, and
intentions and their inscription in an advance directive, which is
best completed before loss of capacity or even the onset of critical
illness. Only thirty percent of Americans report having a living will,
including a mere fifty percent of those with terminal illness, and
more than sixty percent of patients with living wills do not give cop
ies to their physicians. 69 Furthermore, advance directives do not
appear to be the last word, with frequent disputes and misinterpre
tations of intentions by proxies and providers. Communication
among the people involved clearly needs to continue beyond the
sealing of the advance directive through the process of treatment
and the approach of death.70
Communication is chronically undervalued and underfunded
by the public and private health care finance systems. Communica
tion is hard to monitor, hard to justify in measurable terms, and
does not leave a clearly defined material trail for accountants. Ex
cellent end-of-life care can benefit from communication in the ad
vance directive process, through the difficult decisions around the
discontinuation of curative efforts and the adoption of exclusively
palliative care, through counseling and comfort for the dying per
son, and through solace and processing for the bereaved. The
United States health care system is ill-equipped to finance the type
of communication required to improve end-of-life care, and the
pressures on this type of care are likely to increase over time. Phy
sicians can bill Medicare for "advance care planning sessions," but
there is some evidence that the coverage is not widely known
among physicians.7 1
Physician reimbursement for conversations with patients, for
example, to discuss advance directives, is quite limited under some
care arrangements. The current Resource-Based Relative Value
Scale (RBRVS) for Medicare directs resources towards specialty
rather than general practice and towards expensive technological
69.
AM.

Kevin B. O'Reilly, Defective Directives? Struggling with End-aI-Life Care,
Jan. S, 2009, http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/2009/01IOS/prsaOlOS.

MED. NEWS,

htm.
70. The apparently impending national drive to create electronic medical records
may have a significant effect on this communication.
71. MOON & BOCCUTI, supra note 19, at 1.
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interventions rather than office visits.7 2 Capita ted fees also reduce
the physician's incentive to engage in discussion about long-term
planning, such as presenting and discussing advance directives. Yet,
there is some evidence that physician discussion of advance direc
tives does increase uptake by patients. However, one component of
the SUPPORT study, a randomized controlled trial of incentives to
participate in conversations about care directives, failed to demon
strate an impact of physician-initiated discussion on patient willing
ness to express preferences regarding end-of-life care.73
The Kessler and McClellan study found mixed results with re
spect to the effect of interstate variation on advance directive policy
on the structure of care and the use of health resources at the end
of life.7 4 As with palliative care, the use of advance directives
seems to have little relationship to the cost of treatmentJ5 States
that provide greater incentives for following the dictates of advance
directives have a modestly lower share of deaths occurring in acute
care hospitals, but a slightly higher rate of nonacute hospital stays.76
States that provide for the appointment of a surrogate decision
maker in the absence of advance directives have a slightly higher
share of deaths occurring in the hospital, but a slightly lower rate of
nonacute hospital stays.77 The nondefinitive results suggest the
possibility of imprecise coding of the state institutional environment
or a limited impact that is swamped by other factors.7 8

72. See Paul B. Ginsburg & Robert A. Berenson, Revising Medicare's Physician
Fee Schedule-Much Activity, Little Change, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1201 (2007) (dis
cussing the possible shortcomings of the RBRVS); John D. Goodson, Unintended Con·
sequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale Reimbursement, 298 JAMA 2308
(2007) (same).
73. See Laura C. Hanson, James A. Tulsky & Marion Danis, Can Clinical Inter
ventions Change Care at the End of Life?, 126 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 381 (1997),
available at http://www.annals.orglcgi/contentlfull/126/5/381; see also supra note 17.
However, Emanuel and Emanuel criticize the design of the communication interven
tion in the SUPPORT study because it involved indirect communication from the pa
tient to the physician via a nurse facilitator. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 34, at
1908.
74. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 32, at 20.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 19-20.
77. /d. at 20.
78. Id. at 4.
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WHO RECEIVES HIGH-QUALITY END-OF-LIFE CARE?
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CARE BY RACE AND INCOME

So far we have suggested that there are weak incentives for
high-quality end-of-life care and substantial incentives for ineffi
cient cost shifting. Market and institutional factors disempower pa
tients from demanding high-quality care, and inhibit providers from
supplying high-quality care to many dying people. Discontinuous
care systems and sharp resource shifts among providers, and be
tween providers and payers, depending on the organization of care,
are examples of these incentives and large cost shifts. In this clos
ing section, we examine some of the consequences of the underde
veloped and understructured end-of-life care system. Shortcomings
in care are often most apparent among the least empowered peo
ple. We examine the racial and economic distribution of care as
markers of how care is, or is not, made available.
African Americans are significantly more likely to die in hospi
tals and less likely to die in hospice care than are whites,79 African
Americans constituted 8% of deaths in hospice care, although they
constituted 11 % of the population and 11.4% of deaths from heart
attack, cancer, and stroke. 8o African Americans were also more
likely to spend less time in hospice care. Of hospice deaths for
whites, 37.4% involved care for more than one month, while for
African Americans, only 31.5% involved hospice care for more
than one month. 81 Furthermore, the cost of care in the last year of
life is actually higher for African Americans than for whites. 82
One interpretation of these observations is that African Amer
icans and other minorities, fearing hospice as a form of warehous
ing and a site in which the medical needs of minority patients can
be systematically ignored, eschew hospice and insist on more ag
gressive, hospital-based intervention. 83 For example, one health
79. The National Center for Health Statistics reports general statistics on the use
of hospice care. See FASTSTATS - Hospice Care, Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hospicecare.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
80. See MELONIE HERON, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEATHS:
LEADING CAUSES FOR 2004, at 12 tbl.E, 95 tbl.l (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_05.pdf.
81. CHARACTERISTICS OF HOSPICE CARE DISCHARGES, supra note 20, at 10.
82. Amresh Hanchate et aI., Racial and Ethical Differences in End-of-Life Costs:
Why Do Minorities Cost More Than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493
(2009).
83. See, e.g., LAVERA CRAWLEY & MARJORIE KAGAWA SINGER, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, RACIAL, CULTURAL, AND ETHNIC FACTORS AFFECTING
THE QUALITY OF END-OF-LIFE CARE IN CALIFORNIA: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA
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care provider opined, "[p]eople who have been fighting for access
to that healthcare system are likely to be suspicious that we're just
looking for a reason to not give them all these goodies they've been
trying to get. "84
There is, however, another explanation of the racial disparity
that does not require attribution of ethnically specific tastes. A
myriad of studies regarding the many dimensions of health care,
including preventive care, cardiovascular care, and cancer, find that
in the United States, African Americans and other minorities re
ceive worse health care. There is no reason to believe that end-of
life care is different. The minority-white hospice gap provides indi
rect evidence that hospice-based end-of-life care is good care that is
offered to and accepted by patients who generally receive higher
quality health care.
Further evidence that hospice care, along with other forms of
high-quality health care, is disproportionately available to people of
higher socioeconomic status comes from the 1995-1998 Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey.85 Of decedents with incomes above
300% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) , 20% used hospice; of
those with incomes between the FPL and 300%,16% used hospice;
of those with income below the FPL, only 14% used hospice. 86 In
another analysis without access to individual income data, studies
have shown that the cost of care in the last year of life is higher for
decedents residing in high-poverty ZIP codes. 87 The gradient be
tween education and hospice use is present but less pronounced:
more-educated patients are slightly more likely to use hospice
services. 88
Another indicator of socioeconomic discrepancy in the distri
bution of hospice care is its use by the Medicare population at large
and by the Medicaid population. Concerning the length of care,
38.5% of Medicare hospice users and only 26.3% of Medicaid hos
pice users received more than one month of hospice service with
Medicare median length of service at 16.7 days and Medicaid at
only 5.4 days.89 The comparison may be imperfect because MediTIONS 20 (2007), http://www.chcf.org/documents/chronicdisease/CulturaIFactorsEOL.
pdf (for this view and supporting evidence from attitudinal surveys).
84. Mary Engel, Whites Use a Hospice Most, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, http://
articles.latimes.com/2007 /mar/16/local/me-heal thcare16.
85. MOON & BOCCUTI, supra note 19, at 9.
86. Id.
87. Hogan et aI., supra note 40, at 192.
88. Id.
89. CHARACTERISTICS OF HOSPICE CARE DISCHARGES, supra note 20, at 10 tbl.l.
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care users are almost entirely over age sixty-five, while Medicaid
users of hospice include a wider range of ages and a potentially
different mix of diagnoses and reasons for hospice use. 90
To the extent that the insurer difference, neighborhood in
come, and poverty characteristics are proxies for social class, the
comparison contributes to the picture of palliative care as dispro
portionately available to people from higher social classes and ag
gressive, yet futile, treatment as disproportionately applied to
people from lower social classes.
CONCLUSION

This is very much an introduction to, rather than a definitive
statement about, economic issues in the provision of the quality pal
liative care to which we believe every American should be entitled.
Several things stand out clearly. We have been convinced by our
review of the literature that substitution of palliative care for cura
tive treatment offers little opportunity for overall savings in the
health care system. But we have identified two main areas in which
current economic policy inhibits access to high-quality palliative
care: discontinuities for patients and reimbursement for providers.
Not enough information is available about the use and experi
ence of palliative care, and this is an important area for future re
search. The evidence of the chilling effects of economics on access
to care is observed indirectly, through the social and demographic
characteristics of users. Far from being a cheap disposal of the poor
and minorities, palliative care appears to be disproportionately
used by the well-off and white. Additional research could profita
bly be done in the economic dimensions of several other areas of
end-of-life care, as identified throughout the Article. These in
clude, for example, the impact of policies on cost shifting,91 a sys
temic analysis of costs and incentives of palliative care,92 the effect
of Medicare regulations preventing most treatments in hospice even
if those treatments are palliative in effect, and the effect of the new
California law requiring that patients be fully informed of numer
ous alternative forms of end-of-life care. 93
90.

MOON & BOCCUTI, supra note 19, at 1; see also
supra note 67.
91. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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The context of this and other additional research-the need for
some kind of legal guarantee that palliative care will be readily
available so that it can be freely chosen by any dying person-lends
increased importance to doing additional research on the economic
dimensions of end-of-life care. In particular, the reform of health
care in the United States, which we hope is imminent, should take
into account the ways in which economic parameters of end-of-life
care influence the availability and quality of palliative care. Adding
the economic perspective to the other, more overt forms of discour
aging access to palliative care identified early in this Article may
suggest the outline of an approach to litigation regarding the puta
tive right to palliative care. It certainly suggests important consid
erations for creating a legislative right to palliative care as part of
the general reform of health care being undertaken nationally and
in each state.

